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From the mid–1960s to the mid–1980s there was an increase in wage earnings dis-
persion both between, as well as within educational groups in the United States. At the
same time, there were increases in the amount of wage losses following displacements.
This paper quantitatively investigates whether this change, interpreted as increases in
human capital losses following displacements can, in an economy where diﬀerent groups
of workers learn new skills at diﬀerent rates, lead to increases in wage earnings dis-
persion both between and within these groups. In the context of a model calibrated
to match some selected facts of the U.S. labor market, an increase in human capital
losses following a job loss can account for a considerable fraction of the increases in the
wage earnings premium beneﬁting the faster learners, as well as in the variance of both
permanent and transitory earnings of the diﬀerent groups.
1 Introduction
In the last three decades there has been a well documented increase in wage earnings inequality
in the United States.1 Of particular interest for this paper is that this increase occurred not
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1only across diﬀerent educational groups, but also within these groups.2 Figure 1 documents
the evolution of the diﬀerence in average log weekly wage earnings of white males with and
without a college degree. Figure 2 documents the evolution of the standard deviation of log
weekly wage earnings of workers with and without a college degree after conditioning for years
of education.3
A number of researchers have also claimed that economic turbulence has increased in the
last two decades.4 By economic turbulence I mean the average rate of skill depreciation a
worker faces following a job loss. More importantly, some economists think that these changes
may very well be behind the observed increase in wage earnings inequality within groups.5
Economic turbulence, the variable I present as a possible cause for the increase in wage
earnings inequality, can also be thought of as being endogenous. In the context of this
investigation it will be useful to think of it as the consequence of an increase in the depreciation
rate of skills that occurs because ”the way of doing things” changes more often. By this I mean
that particular tasks, used in productive processes, are replaced by more eﬃcient ones at a
faster pace. This kind of exogenous technological change is admittedly diﬃcult to document,
therefore I use the proxy above. Consider why. As new technologies requiring new skills
arrive more often, previously accumulated skills are less relevant, which, for workers that are
displaced, is tantamount to facing a higher skill loss – higher turbulence.
This paper develops a framework to answer the following question: can an increase in
economic turbulence generate quantitatively reasonable increases in wage earnings inequality,
both between and within educational groups?
This research is largely motivated by the theoretical ﬁndings of Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998). Their work shows it is possible to have increases in within-group wage earnings
inequality in a framework where technological shocks to the ﬁrms’ production functions are
absent. This contrasts with most of the existing literature.6 Such a departure from the usual
mechanisms used in the literature begs further investigation, in the present case a quantitative
2See Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993).
3For the sources of the data used in the ﬁgures, please refer to section 4.
4See, for example, Bertola and Ichino (1995), Caselli (1999), Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), and Violante
(2002). For a survey on the increase in job displacement in particular see Kletzer (1998).
5Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) show that an increase in economic turbulence can lead to increases in the
dispersion of wage earnings among ex-ante equivalent individuals.
6See, for example, Acemoglu (1999), Lloyd-Ellis (1999), Galor and Moav (2000), Shi (2001), and Violante
(2002).
2one.
The Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) world is one where agents are ex-ante homogeneous,
so the authors are necessarily silent on issues regarding individuals with diﬀerent abilities.
Their framework – a search model with skill accumulation – is extended to include such a
margin. Individuals are indexed by the rate at which they master new skills. Anybody who
has sat on a school bench is aware of the fact that diﬀerent people learn at diﬀerent speeds.
Some people are able to master new skills very quickly, while it takes others a long time to
do it. This paper formalizes the very intuitive argument that in times when the rate at which
skills depreciate increases, the value of the ability to learn faster also increases. It focuses on
diﬀerences in the ability to learn new skills as a potentially crucial factor in understanding
the changes in inequality in the last three decades.
Although this ability is observable in the model economy, this is not, in general, the case
in the real world. An argument can be made, nonetheless, for the existence of a positive
correlation between the ability to learn fast and education. Faster learners have a lower
cost of learning, therefore, everything else being the same, will stay in school longer. This
means there will be a higher proportion of faster learners among the college graduate ranks
than among high school dropouts. Throughout the paper I will identify slower learners with
non-college educated workers and faster learners with college educated ones.
There is an abundant literature devoted to the study of the increase in earnings inequality
that started in the late 1970s in the United States. This literature can, for the most part,
be divided into two broad groups: one emphasizing changes in institutions, like the decline
in unionization or the decline in the minimum wage,7 the other emphasizing technological
change. In the second group, some authors have addressed the increase in inequality between
educational groups,8 others have addressed the increase in residual inequality,9 while still
others have addressed both kinds of increases.10
The ﬁrst group treats institutional changes as exogenous. In fact, one cannot rule out
the possibility that these changes and the increase in wage earnings inequality both have
7See, for example, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Fortin and Lemieux (1997).
8Contributions in this area include, among others, Katz and Murphy (1992), Caselli (1999), Krusell,
Ohanian, R´ ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000), and Acemoglu (2002).
9See, for example, Violante (2002). Within-group inequality is also referred to as residual inequality in the
literature.
10See, for example, Acemoglu (1999), Lloyd-Ellis (1999), Galor and Moav (2000), and Shi (2001).
3a common source. The drop in the unionization rate, for example, could very well be the
result of increased international trade resulting from lower trade barriers, which could also
be behind the increase in wage inequality according to some authors.11 Compared to this
literature, the framework presented here makes explicit the incentives facing agents, as it is
derived from fundamentals.
The most popular explanation in the literature for the increase in the college premium
seems to be skill-biased technological change.12 The idea is that recent technological advances
complement skilled labor, which leads to skilled workers replacing unskilled workers in some
particular tasks, thus increasing wage earnings inequality between these two groups. The
framework presented here is a much simpler one. Instead of relying on skill-biased techno-
logical change, the model presented here relies on another sort of technological change, an
increase in the rate at which particular productive tasks become obsolete (modelled as an
increase in economic turbulence.)
I ﬁnd that the increase in turbulence, accounts for important fractions of the increases in
the college premium as well as in the variances of both permanent and transitory earnings.13
The magnitudes found indicate that this framework plays an important complementary role
to the literature on inequality and skill-biased technological change.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the model economy. Section 3
describes the equilibrium. Section 4 describes the experiments and presents the results, and
section 5 concludes.
2 The Economy
At any point in time there is measure one of individuals in the economy. The lifetime of an
individual is entirely spent in the labor force. Each period, an individual has a probability ®
of dying, and not remaining in the labor force for next period. This means a measure ® of
people leave the labor force every period. To keep the population constant, a measure ® of
11See for example Murphy and Welch (1991).
12This literature associates education with skills. Thus, college educated workers are often referred to as
skilled workers, while high school graduates or dropouts are referred to as unskilled workers. This has to do
with the fact that the former tend to be white-collar workers, while most of the blue collar workers belong to
the latter group. For this reason, college premium and skill premium are sometimes taken to be synonyms.
13As deﬁned in Gottschalk and Moﬃt (1994).
4people enter the labor force every period. Moreover, the individuals’ age (time since entering
the labor force) is geometrically distributed, with average (1 ¡ ®)=®.
At any point in time an individual has skills h 2 H.
Assumption 1. H is ﬁnite.
Henceforth, let the minimal and maximal elements in H be denoted by hmin and hmax
respectively, and let lh denote the number of elements in H.
A job opportunity is a number w 2 W.
Assumption 2. W has the following properties:
(i) W µ R+;
(ii) 0 2 W;
(iii) W n f0g is compact and convex.
Henceforth, let the minimal and maximal elements in W nf0g be denoted wmin and wmax
respectively.
When faced with a job opportunity, individuals can either accept it, in which case they
are said to be employed, or reject it, in which case they are said to be unemployed. In the
particular case when the job opportunity is w = 0, individuals are said to be unemployed.14
Unemployed agents draw job opportunities for next period, w0, with a probability that
depends both on their type and skill level, pi(h). The job opportunity is drawn from a
distribution function that depends on their type Φi(w) = Pr (w0 · w) deﬁned on W n f0g.
Let B denote the set of Borel subsets of W n f0g and let Ái be the unique probability
measure, on the measurable space (W n f0g;B), associated with Φi.
A job opportunity is akin to a wage rate. In this particular case, the job opportunity will
work as a wage rate per skill level. The surplus generated by an individual with skill level h,
matched with job opportunity w is e = wh.15
14In this case the accept/reject decision will turn out to be irrelevant.
15In Amaral (2002) I consider the more general case of e = wf(h), where f is a continuous and increasing
function.
5There are two types of individuals, fast learners and slow learners. The subscript i = f;s
indexes individuals by type. Let the measure of fast learners be given by ¹f, and the measure
of slow learners by ¹s, where ¹s + ¹f = 1.16
Individual skills evolve according to Markov chains. The transition probabilities for these
Markov chains depend on whether the individual is employed or unemployed, as well as on
the individual’s type. It is precisely the diﬀerence in the laws of motion governing skill
accumulation that distinguishes the two populations (slow learners and fast learners).
While employed, the transition probability, for an individual of type i, of going from skill
level h this period to skill level h0 next period is given by ¼e
i(h;h0). If the individual is
unemployed, this probability is given by ¼u
f(h;h0). The job match may cease to exist, which
happens with probability ¸i. In this case, the transition probability is given by ¼t
f(h;h0).
The evolution of the individual state variables is as follows. At the beginning of the period,
an individual has state (i;h;w). If w = 0, the individual does not enter a job match and
obtains earnings equal to zero. Next period’s skill level is h0 with probability ¼u
i (h;h0), while
next period’s job opportunity is w0 2 W 0 µ W n f0g with probability pi(h)Ái(W 0), or w0 = 0
with probability (1 ¡ pi(h)). If w > 0, the individual decides whether to accept or reject this
job opportunity. In the case where the individual rejects w, she does not enter a job match
and obtains earnings equal to zero. Next period’s skill level is h0 with probability ¼u
i (h;h0),
while next period’s job opportunity is w0 2 W 0 µ W n f0g with probability pi(h)Ái(W 0), or
w0 = 0 with probability (1 ¡ pi(h)). In the case where the individual accepts w, she enters a
job match and obtains earnings equal to wh. If this match dies, which occurs with probability
¸i, next period’s skill level is h0 with probability ¼t
i(h;h0), while next period’s job opportunity
is w0 = 0. If this match survives, which occurs with probability (1 ¡ ¸i), next period’s skill
level is h0 with probability ¼e
i(h;h0), while next period’s job opportunity is w0 = w.
The inclusion of the possibility of a match death is the model’s counterpart of a job loss.
By assumption, after a match dies, the individual is unemployed for at least one period. This
assumption was made for convenience and it does not inﬂuence the results. The match death
probability and subsequent skill evolution are crucial in modelling the changes in turbulence.
In what follows, I state some assumptions about the individual’s transition probabilities.
Assumption 3. Laws of motion for employed:
16These measures are time invariant. Individuals do not choose to be fast or slow learners. This assumption
is an important one and is discussed in the conclusion.
6(i) ¼e
i(h;h0) = 0 for all h0 6= h;h + 1, and i = f;s, where h + 1 is the smallest element in
H strictly greater than h;
(ii) ¼e
f(h;h) · ¼e
s(h;h) for all h.
Assumption 3.(i) states that an employed individual’s skill level next period will either
be the same as in the current period or the skill level immediately above. For employed
individuals, skill level evolution is weakly increasing.17 This implies that once an individual
reaches the maximum skill level, hmax, she will remain there while employed. This assumption,
which is made for simplicity, is the reason why a ﬁxed fraction of individuals, ®, are assumed
to leave the labor force every period, while the same fraction enters the labor force with the
minimum skill level. Finally, assumption 3.(iii) states that, while employed, fast learners have
a higher probability of jumping to the next skill level than slow learners, hence the names for
each of the types.
Assumption 4. Laws of motion for unemployed:
(i) ¼u
i (h;h0) = 0 for all h0 > h;
Assumption 4.(i) states that an unemployed individual’s skill level next period will be
smaller than or equal to the current period’s skill level. For unemployed individuals, skill level
evolution is weakly decreasing. This implies that once an individual reaches the minimum
skill level, hmin, she will remain there while unemployed.
Assumption 5. Laws of motion for job losers:
(i) ¼t(h;h0) = 0 for all h0 > h.
Assumption 5.(i) states that a job loser’s skill level next period will be smaller than or
equal to the current period’s skill level. This reﬂects the extent to which accumulated skills
are still relevant following job losses. It also reﬂects the extent to which ”the way things
are done” changes. One of the environment changes that will be considered is to make the
expected skill level following a match death smaller.
17Topel (1991) ﬁnds evidence in support of the view that the accumulation of speciﬁc capital is an important
ingredient in determining life-cycle earnings.
7Individuals’ period utility is linear in consumption and they maximize future expected







where c is consumption and ¯ is the discount factor.
The linear utility assumption allows me to ignore the private bonds market. Without loss
of generality I can shut down this market.
The individuals’ earnings are assumed to be equal to the surplus generated by the match.
This is equivalent to have the individual own the job match. The purpose of this assumption
is to avoid issues regarding surplus sharing that are fundamentally linked to the nature of the
ﬁrm and are not the main focus of my analysis.18
3 Equilibrium
Let V u
i (h) denote the discounted expected utility of an agent of type i, with skill level h, that
has a job opportunity w = 0, akin to unemployment. V u
i (h) is given by:
V
u




















for i = f;s. Vi(h;w) denotes the discounted expected utility of an individual of type i, with
skills h, that has a job opportunity w > 0, and is given by:
18This does not mean the results would be the same otherwise. Generally, the literature assumes the surplus
generated by the match is shared according to a generalized Nash bargaining rule. See for example Pissarides




























; for i = f;s: (3)
Equation 3 states that an individual of type i, with skill level h, who receives a job
opportunity w > 0, can accept it or reject it. In case of rejection, the individual is unemployed
this period, and the value of that is given by V u
i (h). In case of acceptance, earnings this period
are wh. Next period, with probability (1 ¡ ¸i), the same job opportunity is oﬀered, so the
expected value is taken only over all possible skill levels next period; with probability ¸i the
match dies, so the individual is unemployed next period, which has a value of V u
i (h0) for each
possible skill level next period, h0.
The following proposition states that the optimal policy associated with equation 3 exists
and is unique. All the proofs are in Amaral (2002).19
Proposition 6. Under assumptions 1 and 2, the solution to equation 3 exists and is unique
except for a set of measure zero.
To address characterization, the next proposition states that the optimal policy associated
with equation 3 is of the reservation wage type. If the job opportunity an individual of type
i and skill level h faces is greater than or equal to w
¯
i(h), then it is optimal to accept it,
otherwise it is optimal to reject it.
Proposition 7. Under assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal policy associated with equation 3 is
of the reservation wage form. For any h 2 H there exist numbers w
¯
i(h), i = f;s, such that
an agent of type i with skills h, will accept job opportunity w if w ¸ w
¯
i(h), and reject it if
w < w
¯
i(h). Furthermore, the solution to (3) is nondecreasing in w.
The following proposition further characterizes the solution to (3). It states that the
solution is a continuous piecewise linear function of the job opportunity w.
19The proofs are included in the appendix for the referees’ convenience.
9Proposition 8. Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3, Vi(h;¢) is a continuous piecewise linear
function of w.
Given the individuals’ optimal policies, w
¯
i(h), the next step is to make explicit the laws of
motion governing the transitions between diﬀerent states. Let ¹t(i;h;W), where W µ Wnf0g,
denote the period t measure of individuals of type i, with skill level h, and a strictly positive
job opportunity in w 2 W, while ¹t(i;h;0) denotes those individuals with job opportunity











5 = 1: (4)
For this equation to hold over time, the measure of individuals entering the labor force
has to equal the measure leaving it, given by ®. I assume that those people entering the labor
force do so with a skill level of h = hmin and a job opportunity w = 0.







































The three lines in equation 5 highlight the fact that individuals that are part of the measure
¹t+1(i;h0;W 0) have three possible origins regarding their previous period’s state. The ﬁrst
line refers to those individuals that were employed the previous period at job opportunity
w0 2 W 0, and evolved to skill level h0.20 Only a fraction (1 ¡ ¸i) of these actually gets the
same job opportunity. The second line refers to those individuals that had job opportunity
w = 0 the previous period and evolved to skill level h0. Only a fraction Ái(W 0)pi(h0) will have
20Â(w0¸w
¯ i(h)) is an indicator function that equals one when the argument is true, otherwise it is zero. This
captures the employed only.
10an oﬀer of w0 2 W 0. Finally, the third line captures all those that had a strictly positive job
opportunity the previous period, but rejected it and evolved to skill level h0. Again, only a
fraction Ái(W 0)pi(h0) will have an oﬀer of w0 2 W 0.
Some individuals loose their job, while others simply do not get a job oﬀer after rejecting
one or after having lost their job. These are the people that have w = 0. The evolution of
the measure of these individuals is given by:
¹t+1(i;h



































The ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side of equation 6, ®Â(h0=hmin), is the measure of people
entering the labor force for the ﬁrst time. The ﬁrst line inside the curly brackets includes
all individuals that were employed in the previous period, but lost their job and evolved to
skill level h0. The second line refers to those individuals that had job opportunity w = 0 the
previous period and evolved to skill level h0. Finally, the summation in the third line captures
all those that had a job opportunity w > 0 the previous period but rejected it and evolved to
skill level h0.
I will consider only steady-state equilibria. I do this because both the college diﬀerential
and the residual wage dispersion seem to be relatively stable (although at diﬀerent levels) in
the late 1960s and in the late 1980s to early 1990s. In contrast, in between the two periods,
these variables show a positive trend, suggesting that the former steady-state was perturbed
by some kind of shock followed by dynamics leading to the latter steady-state.21
The following is the deﬁnition of steady-state equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 9. A steady-state equilibrium is a set of reservation job opportunities, w
¯
i(h),
and associated invariant probability measures, ¹(i;h;W), W µ W n f0g, and ¹(i;h;0), such




i(h) are the optimal policies for (3), for each type i, and each skill level h;
2. given w
¯
i(h), ¹(i;h;W), and ¹(i;h;0) solve (4), (5) and (6).
Note that the measures ¹(i;h;W) and ¹(i;h;0) are the invariant measures associated with
equations 5 and 6.
The next proposition shows existence and uniqueness of the above equilibrium.
Proposition 10. Under assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the equilibrium in deﬁnition 9 exists
and is unique.
The framework developed will now be used to conduct experiments that will help deter-
mine whether increases in the average rate of skill depreciation following job losses can help
us understand the observed increase in wage earnings dispersion both between, and within
the two groups.
4 Experiments
In this section I conduct experiments that can be thought of as resulting from an increase in
the rate at which tasks become obsolete. The average rate of skill depreciation following a
job loss increases and the economy moves from a steady-state with relatively low turbulence
to a steady-state with relatively high turbulence.
I use data for two purposes. To establish a benchmark against which to compare the
results of the experiments involving the model economy and to calibrate the model economy.
The latter is postponed to the next subsection and here I will describe the data and measures
used.
I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) March ﬁles, as well as two supplements to
the CPS: the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) and the Job Tenure Supplements (JTS). I
consider full-time, full-year, white male workers between 20 and 64 years of age, that are not
self employed. I consider this particular set of workers because in the model economy there is
no choice regarding how much time to work. This is intended to avoid biases caused by workers
that are heterogeneous in dimensions that the model economy ignores. This is also the reason
12I look at white males only: the model economy is unable to capture wage dispersion stemming
from gender and racial diﬀerences, and this is the most numerous gender/race subgroup.
The measure of earnings adopted is the log of weekly wages. The weekly wage earnings are
deﬂated by the 1982-84 Consumer Price Index for urban consumers published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. This is the most common measure of wage earnings in the literature.
I divide this sample into two distinct populations, those with a college degree and those
without a college degree.22 Relative to the model economy, I identify college graduates with
fast learners, and the rest of the population with slow learners. Besides the arguments pre-
sented in the introduction regarding this choice, ﬁgure 3 presents hourly wage earnings by
tenure for these two groups computed from the JTS.23 This ﬁgure supports the view that,
while on the job, college workers seem to learn faster, to the extent that a higher growth in
wage earnings reﬂects increases in the skill level. Note that while it takes non-college educated
workers 28 years, on average, to attain the maximum wage earnings, it takes college educated
workers only 23 years.24 This will be used later to calibrate the laws of motion governing the
employed workers’ skill level, ¼e
i(h;h0).
From the data, I determine benchmarks for changes in: i) a measure of relative wage
earnings and; ii) a measure of within-group wage earnings dispersion. The measure of relative
wage earnings I use is the college diﬀerential, which is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in average
log weekly wages between college educated individuals and those without a college educa-
tion. This measure approximates the college premium (deﬁned as the ratio of average weekly
wages minus one), for small enough premia. This is presented in Figure 1. Note that the
college diﬀerential was much lower in the late 1960s than in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Furthermore, during these two periods, this measure remained relatively stable.
The measure of wage earnings dispersion within groups I use is the standard deviation of
log weekly wage earnings for each of the two groups. I regress the log weekly wage earnings
on years of education, and then calculate the standard deviation of the residuals of this
regression. These are shown in Figure 2. Note that the residual wage dispersion was much
lower in the late 1960s than in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Furthermore, during these two
periods, this measure remained relatively stable.
22By a college degree I mean having completed at least a BA, AB, or BS.
23Details regarding the data for the ﬁgures and tables presented are in the appendix.
24Figure 3 does not control for potentially important factors such as ﬁrm size or industry, so it should be
interpreted with reservations. Nonetheless, Murphy and Welch (1990) obtain similar results.
13Another important dimension in which residual dispersion increased is reported by Gottschalk
and Moﬃt (1994). They ﬁnd that between 1970-78 and 1977-87, both the variance of per-
manent earnings, as well as the variance of transitory earnings increased. Focusing on the
white males in the Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID)25, they decompose
individual log yearly wage earnings over time into a permanent and transitory component:
yit = ¹i + ºit. They proceed to compute the average (across individuals) variance of the
permanent component, ¹i, as well as the average (across individuals and over time) variance
of the temporary component, ºit, over the two periods.
Table 1 presents the changes in summary statistics against which the changes in the
model’s counterparts to these statistics will be compared.
The DWS data is used to compute wage earnings losses following displacement, as well as
the fraction of workers that are displaced. There are two important qualiﬁcations that need
to be made clear. One is that not all the workers that loose their job are displaced, some are
ﬁred, and some others quit.26 In the next subsection I make clear what kind of assumptions
are made regarding workers that are ﬁred or quit. The second point to note is that the DWS
only started in 1984, so it is impossible to know, using this survey, how the wage earnings
losses and the job loss rate evolved from the late 1960s to the late 1980s and early 1990s. In
the next subsection I examine evidence on this issue from other sources.
A potentially important determinant in the law of motion governing the skill level following
a job loss is whether the agent changes occupations (is a switcher ) subsequently or not, the
idea being that job losers that switch should face higher wage earnings losses, since they loose
both occupation-speciﬁc capital (associated with the occupation change), as well as person-
speciﬁc capital (associated with an unemployment spell). To be able to accommodate for this
possibility, let °i denote the probability that an individual of type i changes occupations, and
let ¼ts(h;h0) and ¼tns(h;h0) denote the probability of going from skill level h to h0 following a
job loss, for switchers and non switchers, respectively. Then, equation 3 becomes:
25Gottschalk and Moﬃt (1992) argue that the PSID tracks the CPS quite well in terms of the trends in the
variance of log wage earnings.
26A worker is considered displaced, according to the 1984-92 DWS, if she was involuntarily separated from
her job due to a plant closing, an employer going out of business, a layoﬀ from which [the worker] was not
recalled, a seasonal job ended, or failure of a self-employed business. The 1994-98 DWS, takes into account







































for i = f;s:
(7)
Note that the introduction of switchers and non-switchers does not change any of the
results in section 3.
Table 2 presents three-year displacement rates for switchers and non-switchers.27 The
displacement rates faced by non-college educated workers are considerably higher than those
faced by college educated ones. This suggests that non-college educated workers are the ﬁrst
out the door when ﬁrms have to cut jobs. This may be because the costs of laying oﬀ college
educated workers are higher, which is certainly true if one thinks about severance payments,
but most importantly for this line of research is that ﬁrms seem to recognize that college
educated workers can adapt more easily to new technologies. Another fact that stands out
is that the displacement-non-switching rates are considerably smaller than their switching
counterpart. This tells us that among those workers that are displaced, most of them (63.8%
of the college educated and 67.7% of the others) change occupations. Such a statement should
not be confused with a statement saying that most of the workers that separate from a job
change occupations. Recall that I am just looking at displaced workers, thus ignoring quits
and ﬁrings. These facts will be used in the next section to calibrate the probability of a job
loss, ¸i, and the probability of subsequently switching , °i.
Regarding the change in wage earnings workers face after being displaced and switching
occupations (or not), the statistic I compute is the diﬀerence in log weekly wage earnings
between the current and the previous job. In the context of the model, this is an indicator
27I present three-year displacement rates so that they are directly comparable to Farber (1997). Details
regarding the computation of these rates are in the appendix. In Amaral (2002) I present more details about
the data, namely a demographic breakdown.
15of the skill change workers face when they are displaced. This is used in the next section to
calibrate the laws of motion for skills after displacement: ¼ts
i (h;h0) and ¼tns
i (h;h0).
Table 3 presents the data on the log wage earning diﬀerence following displacement. As
expected, the wage earnings losses suﬀered by displaced switchers are, on average, higher
than those suﬀered by displaced workers that subsequently ﬁnd a job in the same occupation.
Also, note that the wage earnings losses faced by the non-college educated workers are, on
average, higher than those faced by the college educated ones. This is more so for switchers
than for non-switchers. A pattern that holds on average is that among displaced workers,
the non-college switchers are the ones that loose the most, followed by the college switchers,
followed by non-college non-switchers, ﬁnally followed by college non-switchers.
4.1 Increases in Turbulence
As discussed in the introduction, a number of authors have claimed that the average rate of
skill depreciation following a displacement, termed here economic turbulence, has increased
in the last two decades.28 The most solid evidence for this is provided in Violante (2002).
Using the PSID, he measures white males’ wage losses upon displacement (computed as the
diﬀerence between the hourly wage on the new job N years after separation and the last wage
earned before separation). He divides the sample into two periods: 1970-80 and 1981-90 and
concludes that the wage losses one year after displacement in the second period are higher
than those in the ﬁrst period by roughly 10 percent. There are two problems in mapping this
ﬁnding into the model presented here. The ﬁrst is the slight diﬀerence in time frames. For
the purpose of this model, the ﬁrst period Violante looks at does not coincide with the ﬁrst
period I look at, which is 1963-69. Can we make any inference about the bias caused by this
diﬀerence? If anything, given the qualitative evidence raised most notably by Caselli (1999),
the increase in the wage losses upon displacement would be even higher.
From Low Turbulence to High Turbulence
In this ﬁrst experiment, I calibrate the model using the data reported above and assume,
following Violante (2002), that wage losses upon a job loss grew by 10 percent from the 1960s
to 1981-97, both for switchers and non-switchers.
28Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) were, to my knowledge, the ﬁrst to call turbulence to the average rate of
skill depreciation following a job loss.
16In terms of calibration, I set the model period to one week. Both ﬁrms and workers
make very frequent decisions about hiring and looking for jobs. One week seems like a good
approximation. Also, most of the literature reports either hourly wages or weekly wages,
having a period be a week makes the results directly comparable.
In the model economy, a worker’s life coincides with her worklife, so I set the parameter
® such that the expected worklife of a worker is 41 years. This number is reported by
Millimet, Nieswiadomy, Ryu, and Slottje (2002) for both college educated, as well as high
school educated white males in the United Sates. I set ¯, the discount factor, such that the
annual interest rate is 4 percent.
I assume that Wnf0g contains 100 points, evenly distributed between 10 and 1000. The set
H is assumed to contain 21 points, evenly distributed between 1 and 2. This means that the
range for the strictly positive weekly wage earnings is between 10 and 2000. I experimented
with increasing the size of this set, as the observed wage range is wider, but this did not
change the results.
With respect to the law of motion for the skill level when the worker is employed and does
not loose the job, Πe
i = [¼e
i(h;h0)], regardless of the skill level, there is a constant probability
of either staying at h, ¼e
i(h;h), or transiting to h + 1, 1 ¡ ¼e
i(h;h). I select this probability
such that, conditional on continuous employment, the fast workers achieve the maximum skill
level in 23 years, while slow workers do it in 28 years. These values are taken from ﬁgure 3.
With respect to the law of motion for the skill level when the worker is unemployed,
Πu
i = [¼u
i (h;h0)], regardless of the skill level, there is a constant probability of either staying
at h, ¼u
i (h;h), or transiting to h ¡ 1, 1 ¡ ¼u
i (h;h). I let ¼u
i (h;h) = 0:9, this means that,
conditional on a year of continuous unemployment, both types of workers loose between 0
and 18.3 percent (depending on their skill level). Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate that
workers loose between 10 percent (blue collar) and 30 percent (white collar) of their skills
following a one year spell of unemployment. One could argue that most college graduates
are white collar workers, while most blue collar workers are non-college educated. I opted for
giving both groups the same value since the results are not sensitive to this number.
The job loss rate must include workers that are ﬁred in addition to those that are dis-
placed. Recall that I only have these rates available for displaced workers. Using data from
the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project for 1980, Campbell III (1997), concludes that dis-
placement rates and ﬁring rates are very similar. For non-college educated male workers the
17probability of being ﬁred is 8.8 percent higher than the probability of being displaced. For col-
lege educated workers, the probability of being ﬁred is 6.2 percent higher than the probability
of being displaced. Contrarily, using PSID data from 1976 to 1991, Valletta (1998) concludes
that for males the probability of being displaced is 4.4 percent higher than the probability
of being ﬁred. Given the magnitudes at hand (a small percentage of a probability around 10
percent), and in the interest of simplicity, I will assume that the probability of ﬁring is the
same as that of displacement. From table 2, the total probability of displacement for non-
college workers is 9.9 percent (6.7 percent are switchers and 3.2 percent are non-switchers).
This means the total three year probability of a job loss for non-college workers, ¸s, is 19.8
percent. Of these, 67.7 percent are switchers (°s) and the rest are non-switchers. The total
three year probability of displacement for college workers is 5.8 percent percent (3.7 percent
are switchers and 2.1 percent are non-switchers). This means the total probability of a job
loss for college workers, ¸f, is 11.6 percent. Of these, 63.8 percent are switchers (°f) and the
rest are non-switchers.
Abusing language, I will say that each of the remaining parameters are calibrated to a
particular statistic. In fact, they aﬀect the statistics they are calibrated to jointly. Below, I
paired parameters with the statistics they inﬂuence more strongly.
As discussed before, and following Violante (2002), I assume that the wage earnings losses
following a job loss grew by 10 percent from the 1960s to 1981-97. Violante’s estimation
considers switchers and non-switchers together. I assume that the change was the same for
both types.
The calibration of the law of motion for the skill level following a displacement, Πt
i =
[¼t
i(h;h0)], follows Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).29 Recall from assumption 5, that, for h0 > h,
¼t
i(h;h0) = 0. For h0 · h, let ¼t
i(h;h0) be proportional to the left side of a normal distribution
that has mean h and standard deviation ¾t
i. Formally, for h0 · h, ¼t
i(h;h0) / fN(h;¾t
i)(h0).
This means that for h0 · h, ¼t
i(h;h0) is a discrete approximation to the left side of a normal
that has been truncated and resized to integrate to one. Under this modelling approach, the
parameter ¾t
i is an indicator for economic turbulence.
When a worker looses her job, a higher ¾t
i implies a lower expected skill level next period.
I then set ¾t
i such that the average log wage earnings loss following a job loss, for each group,
29For notational simplicity I will omit the superscripts relative to switchers and non-switchers, meaning
that where it reads ¼t
i, it should read ¼ts
i and ¼tns
i .
18in the model economy, is the same as the average log wage earnings loss faced by college
and non-college educated white males following a job loss and switching (or non-switching)
occupations. This formulation assumes that people that are displaced and people that are ﬁred
suﬀer the same skill losses. This is a shortcut since I do not have data for wage earnings losses
following ﬁrings (rather than displacements). Recall from table 3 that the average wage loss
for white male switchers in the latter period was 7.1 percent for the college educated workers
and 11.9 percent for the non-college educated. The wage losses for the two groups of switchers
in the 1960s are then set to 6.5 percent and 10.8 percent, respectively. For the non-switchers,
the wage losses in 1981-97 averaged 3 percent for the college educated and 4.5 percent for the
non-college educated. Given the above assumption, the wage losses for the non-switchers in
the 1960s are set to 2.7 percent for the college educated and 4.1 for the non-college educated.
Regarding the probability of receiving a job opportunity, pi(h), I assume that it is a strictly
increasing linear function of h and that pi(hmax) = 1. This way, the only parameter that needs
to be calibrated is pi(hmin). I set this parameter such that the average wage earnings of the
workers with the smallest skill level in the model economy, in each group, are the same as the
average wage earnings of white males with the smallest skill level in the U.S economy. I do




















weeks for slow workers. Given the average log weekly wage earnings by experience level, I
compute an upper bound (since I am assuming continuous employment) on the average log
weekly wage earnings that workers with such experience make. These numbers are, in 1982-
84 log US$, 5.46 for the non-college educated workers and 5.81 for the college educated ones
in the 1963 to 1969 period. I then calibrate pf(hmin) and ps(hmin) such that, in the model
economy, the average log weekly wage earnings of the fast and the slow, with the lowest skill
level, equal these numbers, respectively.
I construct the distribution from which the workers draw wages, Ái, from a normal dis-
tribution with mean ¹w
i and standard deviation ¾w
i . Since the support of this distribution
19is the ﬁnite set f10;20;:::;1000g, I make the distributions discrete and rescale them so that
they integrate to one. I set the means of these distributions, ¹w
i , such that the average log
weekly wage earnings in the model economy, for fast and slow workers, equal the average
log weekly wage earnings of U.S. white male workers that have a college education (6.33 log
1982-84 US$) and those that do not (5.94 log 1982-84 US$) over the 1963-69 period. I follow
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and set the standard deviation of this distribution, for both
types, to 100.30 The complete calibration is presented in table 4.
The results of this experiment are reported in table 5. The experiment generates two types
of statistics. One type concerns the steady-state distribution of log wage earnings (a cross-
section). These statistics are contained in the ﬁrst three lines of table 5 and are respectively,
the college diﬀerential and the cross-section standard deviation of log weekly wage earnings
for the two groups. The second type of statistics is computed from an artiﬁcial panel and is
contained in the last four lines of table 5. These are the variance of the permanent component
of earnings for both types, var(¹j)i, and the variance of the transitory component of earnings
for both types, var(ºj)i. They were computed from a panel of 20,000 individuals (10,000 of
each type) simulated over 10 years. Since Gottschalk and Moﬃt (1994) purge their statistics
of life-cycle eﬀects, I consider only individuals with over 40 years of experience, which should
be enough to remove any life-cycle eﬀects since, on average, it takes 28 (23) years for fast
(slow) individuals to reach the maximum skill level.
The model generates an increase in the college diﬀerential that is of a similar order of
magnitude as that in the data. The increase in the college diﬀerential in the model is roughly
11 percent of the one in the data. This conﬁrms the intuition that in times when skills
depreciate faster, being able to learn relatively faster commands a higher premium than in
times when skills depreciate slower. This magnitude is comparable to the ones obtained in
the literature.31
The next thing to note is that the eﬀects of a plausible change in turbulence on within-
group wage earnings dispersion in the cross-section are negligible. In fact, for the slow, the
wage earnings dispersion decreases slightly. There are at least two easy, although, in this
context, non-informative, ways of having the wage dispersion within the two groups increase.
One is to subdivide the groups further. For example, within the slow, one could have high
30In Amaral (2002) I show that the results are not sensitive to this choice.
31See, for example, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996).
20school dropouts, high school graduates, and college dropouts learn at diﬀerent rates. This
would increase inequality within this group of three kinds of agents because of changes in
average wages between the three subgroups, not because of changes within each of the three
subgroups. Another possible way one can reconcile this result with the data is to have
heterogeneity in learning ability within the two groups. In this context the two groups would
both contain fast and slow learners, but the group termed ”fast” would contain a higher
fraction of fast learners.
If one looks at the panel statistics (in the last for rows of the table) though, and compares
them to the Gottschalk and Moﬃt (1994) numbers, the results are very encouraging. The
change in turbulence is able to account for 50 (12) percent of the change in the variance of the
permanent component of earnings for the (non) college educated individuals. It is also able
to account for 18.6 (2.5) percent of the change in the variance of the permanent component of
earnings for the (non) college educated individuals. The intuition for these increases is that
when faced with a job loss, individuals face more uncertainty regarding their subsequent skill
level, and fall, on average, to a lower skill level than when turbulence is smaller. The net
eﬀect is not obvious, since there is a force pulling in the opposite direction: the fact that jobs
are less valuable in the environment with higher turbulence, also means that the reservation
wages are higher, therefore the interval of accepted wages is narrower.
Note that these results are compatible with the lack of change in the cross-sectional dis-
persion, since for the panel statistics, the sample is restricted to experienced workers, so as
to abstract from life-cycle eﬀects. The cross-sectional results together with the panel results,
seem to indicate that for less experienced workers, the life-cycle eﬀects counteract the eﬀects
of an increase in turbulence resulting in stagnant dispersion.
What is innovative about this framework is precisely the fact that it allows one to ad-
dress both types of increases in dispersion, within and between groups, with success on both
margins.
From No Turbulence to High Turbulence
In this experiment it is assumed that there was no economic turbulence in the 1960s,
meaning that a worker’s skill level following a job loss remained the same. Turbulence in the
1980s and 1990s is set at the level observed in the data. This is done with the purpose of
understanding how much of the changes in the data, in the limit, can this framework account
21for, which is important if one thinks the estimate for the increase in turbulence obtained from
Violante (2002), 10 percent, is a conservative one.
The calibration strategy is the same as the one reported for the previous experiment and
is summarized in table 6.32
The results for this experiment are summarized in table 7. Changes in turbulence can
account for up to eighty percent of the increase in the college diﬀerential, which emphasizes the
potential of this framework. In terms of the cross-sectional residual dispersion, one concludes
that changes in turbulence cannot, in this framework, account for the increases in the data.
Below I try to understand why. In contrast, changes in turbulence have the potential to
account for all the increases in the dispersion of the permanent component of wage earnings.
This potential seems to be more limited regarding the increases in the dispersion of the
temporary component of wage earnings.33
The exaggerated change in turbulence in this experiment is ideal to understand what the
forces at work when turbulence increases are. In the experiments, moving from a steady-state
with low turbulence to a steady-state with high turbulence always decreased average log wage
earnings, regardless of the learning speed. Why is this so? On one hand, in general, an increase
in turbulence makes employment become relatively less attractive than unemployment (future
job opportunities) in such a way that the optimal reservation wage schedule is uniformly
(weakly) higher.34 On the other hand, the fact that the reservation wage schedule is higher,
means less people are employed, which in turn means a lower average skill level. Reinforcing
this eﬀect is the fact that when workers loose their job, they slide further down the skill range
in times of higher turbulence. The last two eﬀects seem to dominate, leading to lower average
wage earnings when turbulence increases. The increase in the college diﬀerential happens
because in times when skills depreciate faster (in a stochastic sense), the ability to learn
faster earns a higher premium. This means that although the reservation wage schedule of
the slow increases more than that of the fast, this eﬀect is dominated by the fact that the
32I only report the parameters that changed from the previous experiment.
33Note, in particular, that the changes in the dispersion of the temporary component of wage earnings are
not monotonic in the changes in turbulence.
34The statement has the qualiﬁcation ”in general”, meaning for most parameter values. This is because
the value of unemployment is also dependant on the value of employment, so anything that lowers the latter,
lowers the former. For some parameter values it happens that, for a given skill level, the reservation wage
under higher turbulence is smaller than the reservation wage under lower turbulence. The tradeoﬀ is the usual
substitution versus income eﬀect, most of the times the former dominates.
22average skill level of the slow falls by more than that of the fast.
The intuition for the lack of change in the cross-sectional residual wage earnings dispersion
is slightly more contrived. Although the higher rate of skill depreciation pushes the earnings
distribution towards smaller values, ”squashing” it against the lower bound of the support, the
overall eﬀect on dispersion depends on the initial earnings distribution. In fact, if the initial
distribution is relatively concentrated on high earnings, dispersion increases with increases in
turbulence, but as the initial steady-state average skill level decreases to lower, more realistic,
values this ceases to be true. In the next section it is shown how this depends crucially on the
calibration of the law of motion of skills while employed. This suggests that this framework
might not be the more appropriate to think about the cross-sectional residual wage earnings
dispersion, as such a simple model is unable to reproduce the actual earnings distribution in
the 1960s.35
Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (1998) Experiment
The Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) experiment is replicated here with the purpose of
understanding why this framework cannot replicate the increase in cross-sectional residual
dispersion. In their model there is only one group of workers and there is no distinction
between switchers and non-switchers. That aside, the only other diﬀerence is that in their
world, workers decide on (costly) search intensity, which aﬀects the probability of obtaining
a job opportunity, while in mine, they are faced with an exogenous probability of getting an
oﬀer. As it will become apparent, this does not inﬂuence the results.36
In table 8 I present the equivalent of their (1998) calibration for a one week period (they
considered a two week period). To this, I add a probability of getting a job oﬀer, given
the minimum skill level, of p(hmin) = 0:4.37 I also report the facts they calibrated to. The
question marks (??) mean that the authors assigned values to parameters without mentioning
what they were matching.
Table 9 presents the results the increase in turbulence they consider. The important thing
to look at is the increase of 5 percent in the standard deviation of the log wage earnings,
35Note that the calibration replicates only a pair of moments.
36Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) consider two types of economies, one with unemployment compensation,
another without it, I am obviously making comparisons to the latter. The purpose of including varying search
intensity in their work was for it to interact with the unemployment subsidy.
37This was not calibrated, it was the number that better matched their results.
23which contrasts with my results, and is in the same order of magnitude as the increases in
the data, reported in table 1. These increases where of 8.8 percent for the college educated
workers and 22.3 percent for the non-college educated ones. I argue that the results regarding
this increase in within group wage earnings dispersion depend crucially on the calibration, so
a discussion of the parameter values is in order. I have nothing to say about the probability
of survival ®, the discount factor ¯, or the probabilities governing the skill’s law of motion
while a worker is unemployed, ¼u(h;h0). The values for the mean and standard deviation of
the distribution of wage draws, ¹w, and ¾w, lead to higher than observed average wages, but
they do not inﬂuence the result.
The value of ¸ seems excessively high. The authors report that this is calibrated to reﬂect
the observation that, on average, a worker holds 10 jobs during her lifetime. The problem with
using this observation is that roughly half of the job separations occur because of voluntary
quits, which one would think are not associated with skill losses as large as those resulting from
displacements and ﬁrings. Granted that some quits can be induced by the policy (in terms
of salaries and beneﬁts, for example) of ﬁrms that are weary of ﬁring or laying oﬀ workers
because of possible severance payments, but this calibration assumes that all quits are of this
sort, completely ruling out quits for better paid jobs, which are quite common. Parrado and
Wolﬀ (1999) report that the wage earnings changes associated with all job separations that
involve occupational changes are in fact positive.
The parameter values chosen to index the turbulence in the two steady-states, ¾(60s) and
¾(90s), imply that the average wage losses are 7 percent in the low turbulence steady-state
and 10 percent in the high turbulence steady-state. This corresponds to a 43 percent growth
in wage earnings losses, which is highly implausible.
The probability of a worker’s skill level to advance is chosen such that a worker takes
7.3 years to reach the maximum skill level. As one can see from ﬁgure 3, this is a gross
overestimation of the learning speed. The numbers implied by the CPS data are 23 years
for college workers and 28 years for non-college workers.38 I argue that this parameter alone
drives the whole increase in cross-sectional dispersion. Such a high learning rate leads to
a huge fraction of the population being bunched at the highest skill level. As a result, the
initial distribution of wage earnings is extremely skewed. An increase in turbulence then
38These numbers are also supported by the ﬁndings of Murphy and Welch (1990). They ﬁnd that maximum
wage earnings are attained at 29 for college educated workers and 33 for non-college educated ones.
24drives these individuals down the skill range, increasing dispersion.39 If the initial earnings
distribution were to be more disperse, decreasing the skill level would not necessarily result
in more dispersion as it is clear from the previous experiments.
4.2 Increases in Turbulence and Occupational Mobility
In the previous section I assumed that the amount of occupational mobility did not change
from one steady-state to another.40 This was done with the purpose of focusing on the increase
in turbulence as the sole driving force. In this section this assumption is relaxed and both
factors are considered together.
There is a growing literature documenting the increase in occupational mobility from the
late 1960s to the 1990s. Parrado and Wolﬀ (1999) look at the PSID from 1969 to 1992 and
conclude that, on average, workers shifted occupations 1.8 times in the 1969-80 period, and
2.1 times in 1981-92. This is an increase of 17 percent. Kambourov and Manovskii (2001)
also use the PSID for the same period and conclude that the fraction of workers switching
occupations each year increased from 10.2 percent in 1969 to 15.5 percent in 1993 at the one-
digit level, an increase of 52 percent, and from 16 percent to 18.5 percent at the three-digit
level, an increase of 16 percent.
The results these authors report are for all workers, meaning they include both workers
that quit their job and changed occupations, as well as those that lost their job involuntarily,
and then changed occupation (the ones of interest here). There are no results for this subgroup
in particular, so I will assume that the increase in the fraction of job losers that switch
occupations was the same as the increase in overall switching. Namely, I will assume that
the increase in the fraction of switchers from one steady-state to the other was 17 percent,
both for the fast learners and for the slow learners. This implies that the fraction of college
educated switchers was 54.5 percent in the late 1960s, while this number was 57.9 percent
for non-college educated workers. I then recalibrate the parameters of the model economy
to match the same statistics as before. The parameters that change relative to the previous
section are reported in table 10. Note that to keep the wage loss upon displacement constant
39There is another factor aﬀecting wage earnings dispersion, which is the variation in the reservation wage
schedule when turbulence increases, but this variation is negligible here.
40Occupational mobility is measured by the number of workers that change occupations as a fraction of
total changes. Where occupations are deﬁned by the 1970 Census of Population and provided by the PSID.
25between the two steady-states, for each type, it was necessary to adjust the parameter indexing
turbulence.
The results for this experiment are reported in table 11.41 In terms of the college diﬀeren-
tial and cross sectional dispersion, including the change in occupational mobility does not add
anything to the results from the previous section. In terms of the panel residual dispersion,
it seems that including the change in occupational mobility is important. Figure 4 illustrates
the changes in the dispersion of the transitory and permanent components of wage earnings
for slow and fast learners. The black bars correspond to the steady-state with low turbu-
lence and low occupational mobility, while the white bars correspond to the the steady-state
with high turbulence and high occupational mobility. In particular, the results regarding the
change in the dispersion of the permanent component of earnings are very encouraging. The
changes considered account for half of the change in the data for the college educated workers
and for one third for the non-college educated ones. The magnitudes for the change in the
dispersion of the transitory component of earnings are more modest.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines whether an increase in economic turbulence as deﬁned in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998) can help us understand the observed increase in wage earnings dispersion
both between and within educational groups in the U.S. economy.
Three fundamental points come out of this research. The ﬁrst one is that indeed, increases
in how fast tasks become obsolete are important in understanding increases in inequality
between educational groups. As ”the way things are done” changes more frequently, faster
learners, because they are able to master new tasks more rapidly, experience an increase in
their wage earnings premium over relatively slower learners. The second one is that in the
context of a search model where workers accumulate skills, increases in turbulence do not seem
to be important in understanding increases in cross-sectional inequality within educational
groups. Third, and in contrast to the second point, this framework is helpful in accounting
for changes in the dispersion of the permanent component of earnings, and to a lesser extent,
in the dispersion of the temporary component of earnings.
41The change in turbulence considered was the same as in the ﬁrst experiment of section 4.1, 10 percent.
26The ﬁrst result should be interpreted as complementary to the existing literature on the
importance of skill-biased technological change. This result emphasizes how a particular kind
of technological change (one that involves increases in the rate of technology obsolescence)
changes the incentives to work, and thus accumulate human capital, for diﬀerent educational
groups, resulting in an increase in the wage earnings diﬀerential between them. This result
does not rely on the fact that diﬀerent educational groups supply diﬀerent kinds of labor,
rather, it relies on diﬀerences in learning speed between workers and how these diﬀerences
interact with changes in the environment.
An important aspect of the increase in the college premium is that it was accompanied by
an increase in the relative supply of college educated workers. In the model presented here,
the decision to acquire more education is not present. A possible strategy to endogeneize
this margin would be to have individuals choose (based on some exogenously drawn cost
parameter) whether to acquire education or to work early in their lives and then have the
skill accumulation speed depend on this choice.
The second and third results together emphasize the need for distinguishing between
life-cycle eﬀects and the eﬀects resulting from an increase in turbulence. Quantitatively
accounting for these two eﬀects is an interesting question for future work.
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30Table 1: Selected White Male Earnings Statistics
Variable 1963-69 1987-97 % Change
College Diﬀerential 0.388 0.483 24.5
sd(log(wes)) 0.412 0.504 22.3
sd(log(wef)) 0.480 0.522 8.8
Variable 1970-78 1979-87 % Change
var(¹i)s 0.175 0.272 55.4
var(¹i)f 0.184 0.200 8.6
var(ºit)s 0.106 0.208 96.2
var(ºit)f 0.065 0.093 43.1
Source: Author’s calculations from the CPS and Gottschalk and Moﬃt (1994).
Table 2: Three Year Displacement Rates
Switchers Non-switchers
Years Non-coll. Coll. Non-coll. Coll.
1981-83 0.093 0.041 0.040 0.021
1983-85 0.078 0.035 0.033 0.021
1985-87 0.068 0.032 0.033 0.023
1987-89 0.055 0.031 0.032 0.021
1989-91 0.083 0.051 0.044 0.027
1991-93 0.059 0.039 0.028 0.017
1993-95 0.054 0.038 0.029 0.020
1995-97 0.043 0.029 0.020 0.018
Average 0.067 0.037 0.032 0.021
Source: Author’s calculations from the DWS.
31Table 3: Post-displacement Earnings Change
Switchers Non-switchers
Years Non-coll. Coll. Non-coll. Coll.
1981-83 -0.154 -0.028 -0.083 0.007
1983-85 -0.105 -0.057 -0.039 0.061
1985-87 -0.080 -0.099 -0.026 0.025
1987-89 -0.085 0.003 -0.007 -0.006
1989-91 -0.147 -0.102 -0.095 -0.107
1991-93 -0.168 -0.186 -0.094 -0.110
1993-95 -0.093 -0.086 0.023 -0.092
1995-97 -0.117 -0.011 -0.040 -0.020
Average -0.119 -0.071 -0.045 -0.030
Source: Author’s calculations from the DWS.
32Table 4: From Low Turbulence to High Turbulence: Calibration
Parameter Value Fact Matched
®s = ®f 0.00047 Average worklife 41 years
¯ 0.99925 Annual interest rate 4.0%
¸s 0.00158 Three-year job loss rate 19.8 %
¸f 0.00084 Three-year job loss rate 11.1%
¾ts
s (60s) 0.20372 Wage loss of 10.8%
¾ts
f (60s) 0.12884 Wage loss of 6.5%
¾tns
s (60s) 0.08246 Wage loss of 4.1%
¾tns
f (60s) 0.06083 Wage loss of 2.7%
¾ts
s (90s) 0.23022 Wage loss of 11.9%
¾ts
f (90s) 0.14318 Wage loss of 7.1%
¾tns
s (90s) 0.08944 Wage loss of 4.5%
¾tns
f (90s) 0.06481 Wage loss of 3.0%
°s 0.67700 Fraction of switchers 67.7%
°f 0.63800 Fraction of switchers 63.8%
¼e
s(h;h) 0.98645 28 years to reach hmax
¼e
f(h;h) 0.98355 23 years to reach hmax
¼u
s(h;h) 0.90000 Yearly skill loss between 0 and 18.3%
¼u
f(h;h) 0.90000 Yearly skill loss between 0 and 18.3%
ps(hmin) 0.08000 Log earnings of least skilled 5.46
pf(hmin) 0.40000 Log earnings of least skilled 5.81
¹w
s 70.0000 Average log earnings 5.94
¹w
f 118.000 Average log earnings 6.33
¾w
s 100.000 No fact (Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998))
¾w
f 100.000 No fact (Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998))
33Table 5: From Low Turbulence to High Turbulence: Results
Model U.S. Economy
Variable No Turbulence Turbulence % Change % Change
College Diﬀerential 0.390 0.400 2.6 24.5
sd(log(wes)) 0.363 0.362 -0.3 22.3
sd(log(wef)) 0.267 0.268 0.4 8.9
var(¹i)s 0.089 0.095 6.7 55.4
var(¹i)f 0.023 0.024 4.3 8.6
var(ºit)s 0.041 0.042 2.4 96.2
var(ºit)f 0.025 0.027 8.0 43.1
34Table 6: From No Turbulence to High Turbulence: Calibration
Parameter Value Fact Matched
¾ts
s (90s) 0.28810 Wage loss of 11.9%
¾ts
f (90s) 0.13964 Wage loss of 7.1%
¾tns
s (90s) 0.10000 Wage loss of 4.5%
¾tns
f (90s) 0.06519 Wage loss of 3.0%
ps(hmin) 0.21000 Log earnings of least skilled 5.46
pf(hmin) 0.40000 Log earnings of least skilled 5.81
¹w
s 20.0000 Average log earnings 5.94
¹w
f 110.000 Average log earnings 6.33
Table 7: From No Turbulence to High Turbulence: Results
Model U.S. Economy
Variable No Turbulence Turbulence % Change % Change
College Diﬀerential 0.390 0.468 20.0 24.5
sd(log(wes)) 0.324 0.303 -6.5 22.3
sd(log(wef)) 0.266 0.267 0.4 8.9
var(¹i)s 0.041 0.085 107 55.4
var(¹i)f 0.023 0.027 17.4 8.6
var(ºit)s 0.043 0.053 23.3 96.2
var(ºit)f 0.032 0.032 0.0 43.1
35Table 8: Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998): Parameter Values
Parameter Value Fact Matched
® 0.00045 Average worklife 42.7 years
¯ 0.99925 Annual interest rate 4%
¸ 0.00450 Tenure before job loss 4.3 years
¾(60s) 0.14142 ??
¾(90s) 0.20000 ??
¼e(h;h) 0.95000 7.3 years to reach hmax
¼u(h;h) 0.90000 Yearly skill loss unemployed between 0 and 18.3%
¹w 500.000 ??
¾w 100.000 ??
Table 9: Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998): Results
Variable Low Turbulence High Turbulence %Change
sd(log(we)) 0.200 0.21 5.0
var(¹i) 0.006 0.009 50.0
var(ºit) 0.016 0.018 12.5
36Table 10: Increases in Turbulence and Occupation Mobility: Calibration
Parameter Value Fact Matched
¾ts
s (60s) 0.19235 Wage loss of 10.8%
¾ts
f (60s) 0.12884 Wage loss of 6.5%
¾tns
s (60s) 0.07937 Wage loss of 4.1%
¾tns
f (60s) 0.06082 Wage loss of 2.7%
°s(60s) 0.57900 Fraction of switchers 57.9%
°f(60s) 0.54500 Fraction of switchers 54.5%
Table 11: Increases in Turbulence and Occupation Mobility: Results
Model U.S. Economy
Variable No Turbulence Turbulence % Change % Change
College Diﬀerential 0.390 0.398 2.1 24.5
sd(log(wes)) 0.363 0.362 -0.3 22.3
sd(log(wef)) 0.267 0.268 0.4 8.9
var(¹i)s 0.081 0.095 17.3 55.4
var(¹i)f 0.023 0.024 4.3 8.6
var(ºit)s 0.040 0.042 5.0 96.2
var(ºit)f 0.026 0.027 3.8 43.1
37Figure 1: White Male College Diﬀerential










Figure 2: White Male Log Weekly Wage Earnings Residual Dispersion




























38Figure 3: White Male Hourly Wage Earnings

































Figure 4: Increases in Turbulence and Occupation Mobility: Residual Earnings
Dispersion
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Distribution of permanent earnings (fast)
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396 Appendix
6.1 Data
Table 1: The college diﬀerential and the cross sectional standard deviations are computed averaging
over the 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989,
1991, 1993, 1 and 1997 March CPS ﬁles. I consider full-time, full-year, white male workers between
20 and 64 years old, that are not self employed. A full time worker works at least 35 hours per week.
A full year worker works at least 50 weeks a year. Following Katz and Murphy (1992), I exclude
those workers earning less than half the 40 hour week equivalent of the 1982 minimum hourly wage,
which was $3.35. Top coded earnings were multiplied by 1.4. The variances of the permanent and
transitory component of earnings are taken from table 1 in Gottschalk and Moﬃt (1994).
Tables 2 and 3: I use the 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1992 DWS supplements to the January
CPS ﬁles and the 1994, 1996, and 1998 DWS supplements to the February CPS ﬁles. I consider the
same sample as above.
There was a very important change in the survey. The surveys from 1984 to 1992 asked the
workers if they were displaced from a job anytime in the preceding ﬁve-year period. The 1994,
1996, and 1998 surveys asked the workers if they were displaced from a job anytime in the preceding
three-year period.42 Since both surveys also asked in which year the displacement occurred, I
will follow Farber (1997) and compute three-year displacement-switching, and displacement-non-
switching, rates.43
Another problem has to do with the fact that the DWS reports information on at most one job
loss for each worker. Some workers experience more than one job loss in a ﬁve-year or three-year
period. For these workers the reported job loss refers to the longest job lost. In this sense, the DWS
does not measure the total quantity of job losses, but the number of workers who have lost at least
one job in the relevant period.
As all rates, the displacement rates I compute have a numerator and a denominator. For the
denominator I would like to have the number of workers that are at risk of facing a displacement and
posterior occupation switch (or not) during the three year time period. This is not easy to measure.
I take this number to be the number of workers that are employed at the time of the survey. This
approximation is a good one as long as the number of employed does not ﬂuctuate a lot during the
three-year period.
Computing the numerator is more complicated. The ﬁrst problem that arises is that the only
way to know if one worker is an occupation switcher or not is for her to be employed at the survey
date. Naturally, some of the workers who get displaced are not employed at the survey date. To
deal with this problem, I assume that the fraction of displaced workers unemployed at the time of
the survey that are occupation switchers is the same as the fraction of displaced workers employed
at the time of the survey that are occupation switchers. If anything, this simplifying assumption
underestimates the true number of displaced switchers, since being unemployed might be precisely
a consequence of the fact that the kind of task the worker specialized in has become obsolete.
42This change was made to address a severe recall bias problem identiﬁed in Topel (1990).
43Farber (1997) computes displacement rates that include both switchers and non-switchers. I will compute
these rates separately for switchers and non-switchers
40Another problem has to do with the adjustment necessary to convert from ﬁve-year rates to
three-year rates in the 1984-92 surveys. As I mentioned, the survey asks the speciﬁc year the job
loss took place, so it would seem that the solution would be to take into account only those workers
who report job losses in the three years preceding the survey and count those that report losses
four and ﬁve years before the survey as non job losers. There is, however, a serious comparability
problem with this strategy. On one hand, the three-year job displacement rates computed from
1994 to 1998 include displacements reported in the three years before the survey that happened
to workers that also got displaced four or ﬁve years before the survey. On the other hand, the
three-year job displacement rates computed from 1984 to 1992 do not include these displacements
if the displacement that occurred four or ﬁve years before the survey followed a longer tenure than
the displacement that occurred in the three years before the survey.
I follow Farber (1997) in remedying this problem, by adjusting the three-year displacement
rates from the 1984-92 surveys upward, to control for this downward bias. From the 1968-1985
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Farber computes the fraction of workers who reported
an involuntary job change four or ﬁve years before the survey date and subsequently reported an
involuntary job change within the three years preceding the survey. Letting ±4 denote the fraction of
workers that lost a job four years before the survey and subsequently lost a job in the three periods
before the survey, and ±5 denote the fraction of workers that lost a job ﬁve years before the survey
and subsequently lost a job in the three periods before the survey, he estimates that ±4 = 0:3017,
and ±4 = 0:2705.44
The numbers found suggest that not considering this downward bias can seriously underestimate
the amount of workers losing jobs in the three years before the survey, if one simply ignores those
workers that report job losses four or ﬁve periods before the 1984-92 DWS surveys.
To summarize, let ¸i denote the three year displacement-switching rate in demographic group i.
Let des3
i denote the sum of the number of workers that report a displacement in the ﬁrst, second or
third year before the survey, and also report an occupation change.45 Let des4
i, and des5
i denote the
number of workers reporting a displacement in the fourth or ﬁfth year before the survey, respectively,
and also report an occupation change. Let du3
i denote the sum of the number of workers that report
a displacement in the ﬁrst, second or third year before the survey, and are unemployed at the date
of the survey. Let du4
i, and du5
i denote the number of workers reporting a displacement in the fourth
or ﬁfth year before the survey, respectively, and are unemployed at the date of the survey. Let ei




denote the number of displaced and currently employed by year that the displacement was reported.























44The structure of the PSID sample used is described in Farber (1997). Of particular interest is that the
sample was 89.7 percent male. I will use the same numbers for the three demographic groups considered since
Farber does not report any demographic breakdowns of these numbers.
45Therefore they are employed at the date of the survey,

















The rate of displacement-non-switching is computed in a similar fashion.
Figures 1 and 2: Same data as for table 1.
Figure 3: I use the 1987, 1991, and 1996, JTS supplements to the CPS. Same demographic
sample as for table 1.
6.2 Proofs
The proofs are included for the referees’ beneﬁt and can easily be dropped from the paper since they
are standard.
Proof. (proposition 6)
Pick any (h;w) 2 H £W nf0g. By assumptions 1 and 2, and because 0 < ® < 1, and 0 < ¯ < 1,
the two alternatives inside the max operator in the right-hand-side of equation 3 are bounded below
by zero and above by wmaxhmax
1¡¯(1¡®) . This guarantees existence.
Given that both alternatives inside the max operator are well deﬁned, either one is diﬀerent from
the other, in which case the solution is unique, or they are equal. I will show that this happens
at most in a set of measure zero. Let the second alternative inside the max operator be denoted
V i(h;w). Again, Pick any (h;w) 2 H £ W n f0g such that V u
i (h) = V i(h;w). Then, because
V u
i (h) is constant in w, while V i(h;w) is strictly increasing in w, for any ² > 0, it follows that
j V u
i (h) ¡ V i(h;w + ²) j> 0.
Proof. (proposition 7)
Fix h. Guess that Vi(h;¢) is nondecreasing in w.
The value the individual obtains when the job opportunity is rejected is constant in w. The
value the individual obtains when the job opportunity is accepted is strictly increasing in w given
the guess.
Let V i(h;w) denote the value of accepting job opportunity w for an individual of type i and
skill level h. It follows that if V u
i (h) · V i(h;wmin), then, w
¯ i(h) = wmin, all oﬀers are accepted and
Vi(h;w) = V i(h;w) for all w 2 W n f0g. If, on the other hand, V u
i (h) > V i(h;wmin), two things
can happen. Either V u
i (h) · V i(h;wmax), in which case w
¯ i(h) is implicitly deﬁned by the equation
V u
i (h) = V i(h;w
¯ i(h)), which has a unique solution given the assumptions, or V u
i (h) > V i(h;wmax),
in which case w
¯ i(h) > wmax, all oﬀers are rejected, and Vi(h;w) = V u
i (h) for all w 2 W n f0g.
The solution to (3) is then of the form:
Vi(h;w) =
½
V i(h;w) w ¸ w
¯ i(h)
V u
i (h) w < w
¯ i(h);
for i = f;s.
This solution is nondecreasing in w, conﬁrming the guess. Noting that the solution to equation
3 is unique yields the result.
42Proof. (proposition 8)
Fix h. For w < w
¯ i(h), from proposition 7, Vi(h;:) = V u
i (h) is constant in w and Vi(h;w
¯ i(h)) =
V u
i (h), so let w ¸ w
¯ i(h). For notational simplicity, drop the subscript i. Again, from proposition 7:












The term in the second line is constant in w, so deﬁne:




Using assumption 3, equation 10 can be rewritten as:










where h+1 is the smallest element in H greater than h. This yields:
V (h;w) =
wh + c(h)
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¸)¼e(h;h)
+
¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ ¼e(h;h))
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¸)¼e(h;h)
V (h+1;w) (11)
Equation 11 deﬁnes a linear operator in the space of real valued functions. Linear transformations
of continuous piecewise linear functions are themselves continuous piecewise linear. It will now be
established that V (hmax;:) is continuous and piecewise linear.





1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¸)
+
hmax
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¸)
w; (12)
which is linear in w. This establishes that V (hmax;:) is linear in w for w ¸ w
¯
(hmax). From
proposition 7, for w < w
¯
(hmax), V (hmax;:) = V u(hmax), which is constant in w. Finally, note
that V (hmax;w
¯
(hmax)) = V u(w
¯
(hmax)). This establishes that V (hmax;:) is piecewise linear in w 2





1¡¯(1¡®)(1¡¸) w w ¸ w
¯ i(hmax)
V u
i (hmax) w < w
¯ i(hmax)
By deﬁnition of w
¯ i(hmax) and convexity of W n f0g, V (hmax;:) is also continuous in w.
The result follows from the operator deﬁned by equation 11 and the fact that linear transforma-
tions of continuous piecewise linear functions are themselves continuous piecewise linear.
Proof. (proposition 10)
43Existence and uniqueness of the optimal policies, w
¯ i(h), were already shown in proposition 6.
Existence and uniqueness of the associated invariant distributions will be shown here. The strategy
of the proof will be as follows. I will start by assuming that the set W is ﬁnite and show that the
result goes through, since this is the case I consider in the computations. I will then show that the
result generalizes to the case where W is as in assumption 2.
Suppose W is ﬁnite. Assume there is just one type, as the proof is analogous for both types,
and ignore the subscript i.
Let S = H £ W and let l = dim(S). Let ¹ 2 4l =
½






measure on (S;S), where S consists of all subsets of S.
Equations 5 and 6 deﬁne a linear transition function that can be represented by an l£l Markov
matrix Π = [¼ij], where ¼i;j represents the probability of moving from state si to state sj, where si,
sj 2 S.
A vector ¹¤ is said to be an invariant distribution if ¹¤Π = ¹¤.
Let ¼
(n)
ij represent the probability of going from si to sj in n steps. Let "
(n)
j = mini ¼
(n)
ij for






Theorem 11.4 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition
under which an invariant distribution ¹¤ not only exists and is unique, but is the unique limit of the
sequence f¹0Πng for any initial distribution ¹0.46 Furthermore it guarantees that S has a unique
ergodic set with no cyclically moving subsets. This result follows if and only if for some N ¸ 1,
"(N) > 0.
It is enough to show that there exists a state sj that is eventually reached with strictly positive
probability from every state si. By assumptions 3, 4, and 5, this is true of the state characterized
by hmax and wmax, for example.
I will now show the result holds when W is of a more general form, as in assumption 2.
Let (S;S) be a measurable space where S = H £W and S be a ¾ ¡algebra of the subsets of S.
Let Ψ(S;S) be the set of probability measures on (S;S). Let Ã 2 Ψ(S;S).
Equations 5 and 6 deﬁne a transition function P : S £ S ! [0;1]. The interpretation is that for
any a 2 S and A 2 S, P(a;A) is the probability that the state next period is in A, given that the
state this period was a. Associated with P, there is an operator T¤ : Ψ(S;S) ! Ψ(S;S) deﬁned by:
(T¤Ã)(A) =
R
Q(a;A)Ã(da), for all A 2 S.
A probability measure Ã¤ is said to be an invariant probability measure if, and only if, it is the
ﬁxed point of the operator T¤, that is: Ã¤ = T¤Ã¤.
Theorem 11.12 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), provides a suﬃcient condition under which
an invariant probability measure Ã¤ exists and is unique. The result follows if there exists ² > 0 and
an integer N ¸ 1 such that for any A 2 S, either PN(s;A) ¸ ², for all s 2 S, or PN(s;Ac) ¸ ², for
all s 2 S, where PN(s;A) is the probability of getting from state s to a state in set A in N steps.
To show that this is true for this particular case, consider again the point in S that has h = hmax
and w = wmax, call it smax.
First we need to ﬁnd N¤. Pick any s 2 S. We need to ﬁnd how many steps it takes to get from s
to smax with strictly positive probability. Let lh denote the number of elements in H. Starting at s,
46This convergence is element by element.
44there is a strictly positive probability that in N¤ = lh +1 steps the state is smax. This result hinges
on assumptions 3, 4, and 5. For states with w = wmax and h 6= hmax this is true for N = hmax ¡ h.
For states with w = 0 this is true for N = lh. For states with w 6= wmax, but w < w
¯
(h), this is
true for N = lh. Finally, for states with w 6= wmax, but w ¸ w
¯
(h), this is true for N = lh + 1. The
maximum over all these numbers is N¤ = lh + 1.





. Clearly, by the reasoning above, ²¤ > 0.
Again, pick any s 2 S and any A 2 S, then, by construction, PN¤
(s;fsmaxg) ¸ ²¤. Then, either
smax 2 A or smax 2 Ac, and the result follows.
45